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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The first attempt to launch Atlantis was made on October 17, 1989, at 12:57 p.m.
Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). It was scrubbed due to rain showers seven miles from
the Return To Launch Site (RTLS) runway. This was a Launch Commit Criteria (LCC)
violation; the LCC requires that there be no rain within 20 miles of the RTLS at launch.
STS-34 launch was rescheduled for the next day, October 18, 1989.
On October 18, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule through the final
planned hold, at T-9 minutes. At T-5 minutes, the countdown was held for 3 minutes
40 seconds to update the onboard computer configuration. This update was required to
reflect the change in the Transatlantic Abort Landing (TAL) site from Ben Guerir,
Morocco to Zaragosa, Spain. Weather at Ben Guerir, the primary TAL site, was
declared unacceptable because of rain near the runway. Atlantis was launched
satisfactorily at 12:53:40 p.m. EDT, and the Orbiter achieved the planned orbit.
Galileo was launched on its six-year journey to Jupiter approximately 6 hours
after the STS launch. Deployment of Galileo from the payload bay was flawless, and
the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) performed nominally. All other payloads and
experiments operated successfully throughout the mission. Overall, STS-34 was an
unqualified success.
Because of a forecast of high winds at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), the
planned landing on orbit 82 was moved up by two orbits. Atlantis landed on EAFB
Runway 23 (lakebed) at 12:33:11 p.m. EDT on October 23, 1989. Nosewheel steering
and crosswind landing development test objectives were not performed.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager prior to each NSTS flight. The intent
of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change, or potential
change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) in
the NSTS Hazard Reports. Unresolved safety risk factors impacting the STS-34 flight
are also documented prior tothe STS-34 Flight Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition)
and prior to the STS-34 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2) Review (L-2 Edition).. This
final mission edition evaluates performance against safety risk factors identified in
previous editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each NSTS flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program Manager with the NASA
Headquarters Safety Division position on significant changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-34 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have impact on this flight, and factors
that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect or have the
potential to affect NSTS safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items agaknst which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
a'_d continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a brief mission description, including launch data,
crew size, mission duration, launch and landing sites, and other
mission-related information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-34 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-34
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that are considered
resolved for STS-34.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-28 mission.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-30
mission.
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-34
mission. Those STS-34 IFAs which are considered to represent
safety risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next NSTS
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-34 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-34 Mission
The first attempt to launch Atlantis was made on October 17, 1989, at 12:57 p.m.
Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). This attempt was scrubbed due to rain showers seven
miles from the Return To Launch Site (RTLS) runway. This was a Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC) violation; the LCC requires that there be no rain within 20 miles of the
RTLS at launch. Launch of STS-34 was rescheduled for the next day, October 18, 1989.
On October 18, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule through the final
planned hold, at T-9 minutes. At T-5 minutes, the countdown was held for 3 minutes,
40 seconds to update the onboard computer configuration. This update was required to
reflect the change in the Transatlantic Abort Landing (TAL) site from Ben Guerir,
Morocco to Zaragosa, Spain. Weather at Ben Guerir, the primary TAL site, was
declared unacceptable because of rain near the runway. Atlantis was launched
satisfactorily at 12:53:40 p.m. EDT, and the Orbiter achieved on the planned orbit.
Galileo was launched on its six-year journey to Jupiter approximately 6 hours after
the STS launch. Deployment of Galileo from the payload bay was flawless, and the
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) performed nominally. All other payloads and experiments
operated successfully throughout the mission. Overall, STS-34 was an unqualified
success.
During ascent, Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) # 1 experienced an anomaly that
caused a shift to the high-speed mode. The crew manually selected the high-speed band
to avoid APU high-speed alarms. APU #1 continued to operate satisfactorily at the
high-speed position for the remainder of ascent. This anomaly caused a change in APU
usage during the mission. APU #3 was used for Flight Control System (FCS) checkout
instead of APU #1. APU #2 was the first APU started for reentry, 5 minutes prior to
the deorbit maneuver. APU #3 was started 13 minutes prior to reentry interface.
Because of the high-speed anomaly with APU #1, and its relation to limited-life
concerns, APU #1 was not turned on until Mach 10, 11.5 minutes before landing.
APU #1 was started in high speed and was shut down shortly after wheel stop.
The Flash Evaporator System (FES), primary "A", shut down after Main Engine
Cutoff (MECO). The secondary high-load operated satisfactorily. Inflight maintenance
was performed on the FES, and the system was restored to normal operation.
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Prior to the second Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) burn, an Input/Output
(I/O) error occurred in the Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM) Flight Aft 1 (FA-1). An
I/O reset attempt failed to recover the unit. The crew successfully port-moded the
MDM to a secondary port, where it continued to operate error-free. The impact of this
anomaly was loss of the redundant data path to MDM FA-1.
At approximately 5 hours Mission Elapsed Time (MET), APU Gas
Generator/Fuel Pump (GG/FP) system "A" heaters were turned on. APU #1 and #3
responded nominally; however, no temperature response was noted for APU #2 heaters.
APU #2, system "B" heaters were selected and operated properly on all three APUs.
During the crew post-sleep period on Flight Day 2 (FD-2), APU #2 GG/FP heater was
switched to system "A" to determine if the total heater system "A" had failed or if only
the gas generator bend heater had failed. During the 3 1/2 hours of heater system "A"
operation, the GG/FP system heaters did not cycle, indicating that the entire heater
system "A" was anomalous.
When the crew attempted to close Cryogenic Oxygen Manifold Valve #2, during
the crew pre-sleep period on FD-2, there was no indication that the valve had closed.
Since the anomaly occurred so close to the sleep period, the cryo tank was placed in a
safe configuration until the beginning of the next flight day. On FD-3, the switch
controlling the cryo valve was actuated and the valve closed as commanded by the crew.
To protect against the valve falling open, the valve was left closed for the remainder of
the mission. The impact of this anomaly was a potential inability to maintain nominal
cryogenic oxygen quantity balancing.
Approximately 58 hours into the mission, APU #2 GG/FP system "B" heaters
started cycling erratically and, during the crew sleep period on FD-4, the APU #2 fuel
pump bypass line temperature sensor violated the upper Fault Detection Annunciator
(FDA) 180°F limit. The crew was awakened to switch to the system "A" heaters and to
monitor associated temperatures. Acceptable APU fuel pump temperatures were
maintained by manual heater cycling during the day and by selected Orbiter thermal
control attitudes during crew sleep periods. On FD-5, the crew switched back to the
system "B" heaters, which again operated erratically. Temperatures, however, were
maintained within specified limits for the remainder of the mission.
Because of a high winds forecast at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), the planned
landing on orbit 82 was moved up by two orbits. Atlantis landed on EAFB Runway 23
(lakebed) at 12:33:11 p.m. EDT on October 23, 1989. Nosewheel steering and crosswind
landing development test objectives were not performed.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Period: October 12, 1989 to November 21, 1989
• Launch Date: October 18, 1989
• Lauch Time: 12:53:40 p.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Zaragosa, Spain (Changed from Ben Guerir, Morocco due
to rain at the Ben Guerir runway.)
• Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Lakebed
• Landing Date: October 23, 1989
• Landing Time: 12:33:11 p.m. EDT
• Mission Duration: 4 Days, 23 Hours, 40 minutes (80 Orbits)
Crew Size: 5
Inclination: 34.3 Degrees
Altitude: 160 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-104 (5)Atlantis
SSMEs: (1) #2027, (2) #2030, (3) #2029
ET: ET-027
SRBs: BI-033
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #6
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2.3 Payload Data
Payload Bay:
• Galileo Spacecraft/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
• Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV)
Middeck:
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test
Growth Hormone Concentration Distribution (GHCD) in Plants
Polymer Morphology (PM) Experiment
IMAX Camera System
Mesoscale Lightning Experiment (MLE)
Sensor Technology Experiment (STEX)
Zero Gravity Growth of Ice Crystals from Supercooled Water with
Relation to Temperature (Project SE82-15)
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-34 ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of the safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved or
not a safety concern for STS-34 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-34 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM
Section 4: Resolved Safety Risk Factors
SRB 5 Aft skirt Factor of Safety
(FOS) waiver.
SRM 3 Putty found on outer igniter
gasket on STS-33 RH Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM)
(preflight).
Section 5:STS-28 lnflight Anomalies
Orbiter 14 Excessive body flap
deflection during ascent.
COMMENT
During STS-34 launch, the holddown
stud at Holddown Post (HDP) #2
(Right-Hand (RH) tension post) hung-up
at liftoff. This resulted in broaching of
the right SRB aft skirt and thread
impressions at the HDP bore. Stud
hangups were recorded on five previous
missions (STS-2, STS-4, STS-51I,
STS-51J, and STS-61A). MSFC
continues to investigate the stud hangup
anomaly.
(IFA No. STS-34-M-01)
During STS-34/SRM postflight
inspection, putty was found up to the aft
face of the outer primary gasket and
into the seal void/gland area between
234 ° and 0° of the right SRM igniter.
This indicates that vertical igniter
installation does not necessarily resolve
the igniter putty problem. The putty did
not go past the primary seal, and no
blowholes were found.
(IFA No. STS-34-M-03)
STS-34/OV-104 ascent film review found
some evidence of body flap deflection;
however, it was not considered as great
as seen on STS-28/OV-102. No damage
to tile or body flap mechanisms was
reported during postflight inspection.
(Not an IFA on STS-34)
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ITEM
Section 5:STS-28 Inflight Anomalies
SRB 1 Loose bolts on the left
Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB) External Tank
Attachment (ETA).
Section 6:STS-30 Inflight Anomalies
SRM 1 Factory joint weather seal
aft edge unbonding.
COMMENT
Postflight STS-34 SRB inspection found
that certain fasteners and connectors
were either not torqued or not properly
safety wired. Effort is underway at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to
emphasize the importance of good
workmanship and proper installation of
fasteners and connectors.
(IFA No. STS-34-K-03).
Three forward edge factory joint weather
seal unbonds were noted on the left-
hand STS-34 SRB. Corrosion was
present on the outside diameter of the
outer clevis leg on both joints. Adhesive
failure implies that the cause of the
unbond is case surface contamination.
No sooting or heat effects were found
under the weather seal, indicating that
the unbonds occurred at splashdown.
(IFA No. STS-34-M-02)
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-34 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a list of the safety risk factors that are considered resolved
for STS-34. These items have been reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is based on findings resulting
from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) reviews (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
INTEGRATION
1
2
3
External Tank/Orbiter Separation Assembly Cartridge failure to generate
sufficient pressure to separate the separation bolt.
Rosemont braze/weld deficiencies.
Rice fastener alert.
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Hydraulic system noise.
Reaction Control System left helium valve "A" failed.
Contamination found in Reaction Control System propellant tank.
Liquid Oxygen umbilical actuator failure.
Orbital Maneuvering System oxidizer propellant inlet line leak.
Auxiliary Power Unit Quick Disconnect leak.
Reaction Control System L2U Thruster combustion chamber overpressure.
OV-104 has four Multiplexer-Demultiplexers that may contain Erie
capacitors which are prone to failure.
Main Propulsion System Flex Hose leakage.
Main and nose gear wheel assembly overinflation plug burst disk concern.
750-pounds per square inch absolute helium regulator failed to lock up
after a "slam test."
Fuel cell separator plate plating defects.
Star Tracker Door stalled during closure.
Backup Flight Software downlist anomaly.
Right-hand Reaction Control System B-leg primary helium regulator
anomaly.
Reaction Control System helium tank liner delaminations/yielding.
Potential tire failure due to undetected delaminations after preroll.
Pyrotechnic harnesses on OV-104 Orbiter/External Tank umbilical have
previously flown.
Orbital Maneuvering System fuel tank weld crack in communication
screen.
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SSME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
SECTION 4 INDEX - (Cont.)
Nozzle tube bulge on engine #2027.
Crack found on diffuser lip of High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump.
Main Combustion Chamber bond line leak.
Main Engine # 1 O-Ring damage.
Severity 2 software problem fix not implemented for STS-34.
Engine #2029 high-pressure fuel duct alignment.
Lack of penetration noted in High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump weld
joint 4.
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump cupwasher rotation.
Engine #2 Controller anomaly.
Engine #0213 Main Combustion Chamber liner cavity diaphragm ruptured
at higher than design pressure.
ET
External Tank Liquid Oxygen tank buckle/dimple (oil can).
Probability exists for the External Tank debris to impact land masses.
Large divot occurred in External Tank acreage Thermal Protection System.
SRB
1
2
3
4
5
Potential criticality 1 failure mode related to Solid Rocket Beacon
Tracking System.
Cracks found in an Auxiliary Power Unit containment housing.
Possible use of improperly certified flight hardware by United Space
Booster, Inc.
Solid Rocket Booster heater cable failed the Dielectric Withstanding
Voltage test.
Aft skirt Factor of Safety waiver.
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SRM
1
2
3
4
5
6
SECTION 4 INDEX - (Cont.)
Defective Hypalon paint used on STS-34 Solid Rocket Motor aft skirt.
Fretting on STS-34 segments.
Putty found on outer igniter gasket on STS-33 right-hand Solid Rocket
Motor.
Solid Rocket Motor lightweight stiffener segment Factor of Safety.
Insulation voids on forward dome.
Forward dome thin insulation Factor of Safety.
KSC_
1 Inadvertent actuation of console keys could lead to critical conditions.
PAYLOAD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Inertial Upper Stage Aft Frame Tilt Actuator overspeed failure mode.
Inertial Upper Stage Explosive Train Assembly B-nut concern.
Inertial Upper Stage Through-Bulkhead Initiator leakage.
Inertial Upper Stage Converter Regulator Unit transistor short.
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator cooling line blockage.
Inertial Upper Stage Safe and Arm device contamination.
Orbiter Environmental Control System overtemperature anomaly.
Vertical Processing Facility payload Environmental Control System failure.
Inertial Upper Stage Aft Frame Tilt Actuator test problem.
Inertial Upper Stage Computer A single-bit errors.
Galileo/Inertial Upper Stage separation switch anomaly.
Galileo Pressure Relief Device attachment bolt anomaly.
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SECTION 5
STS-28 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the STS-28
mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and
rationale are provided.
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ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
SECTION 5 INDEX
Pilot seat moved during ascent.
Vernier thruster FSR annunciated fail leak.
Nose Landing Gear Weight-On-Wheels indication failed off.
Fuel Cell # 1 Hydrogen flow erratic.
Abort light failure.
Forward Reaction Control System F5L heater failed "on".
Main Bus C utility outlet #1 teleprinter short circuit. (Teleprinter cable
anomaly)
Auxiliary Power Unit isolation valve talkback failure.
Low Freon flow.
Right-hand Orbital Maneuvering System fuel quantity gage high.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 test line temperature high.
Crew experienced sneezing.
Hydraulic System #2 unloader valve operated out of specification.
Body flap deflection excessive during ascent.
Orbiter structure heat damage.
Crew reported a loud thump/thud at first OPS-1 transition.
SSME #1 Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve showed sluggish
response.
Early boundary layer transition.
Loose foam on the External Tank Liquid Oxygen Umbilical.
SRB
1
SRM
1
Loose bolts on the left Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment
Ring.
Gask-O-Seal void found during postflight inspection.
KSC
1 Mobile Launch Platform recorders were accidently turned off.
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SECTION 6
STS-30 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the STS-30
mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and
rationale are provided.
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ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
SECTION 6 INDEX
Cabin pressure transducer failed.
The #2 Gaseous Hydrogen pressure system temperature indicator failed.
Center engine Liquid Hydrogen inlet pressure transducer failed.
Fuel Cell #2 Hydrogen flow meter failed.
Left engine Liquid Hydrogen inlet pressure transducer biased low.
Reaction Control System Jet R1U failed off, post External Tank
separation.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Gas Generator fuel pump "A" heaters
inoperative.
Right Orbital Maneuvering System fuel total quantity gage failed.
Right Reaction Control System A-leg oxidizer helium isolation valve failed
open.
Water Spray Boiler #2 Gaseous Nitrogen pressure decay.
General Purpose Computer #4 failed to sync.
Engine helium fill Check Valve failures.
The right Orbital Maneuvering System Gaseous Nitrogen pressure
regulator regulated low.
Main landing gear fluid leak.
Nose wheel steering enable late.
Ding on forward window #6.
The Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator reading was high during Flight
Control System checkout.
Bulkhead blanket damage.
SRM
1
2
3
SRB
1
2
3
4
Factory joint weather seal aft edge unbonding.
Cut in the secondary seal of the outer gasket.
Solid Rocket Motor nozzle snubber ring displacement.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster main parachute failure.
Debris lost from multiple Debris Containment Systems.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment cover sheared
fasteners.
Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attachment Ring cap and
web separation.
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SECTION 6 INDEX - (Cont.)
Leak in 4" Liquid Hydrogen recirculation line.
\
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SECTION 7
STS-34 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of In/light Anomalies (WAs) arising from the STS-34
mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and
rationale are provided.
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ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
SECTION 7 INDEX
Engine Interface Unit #3 momentary 60-kilobit data stream loss.
Attxiliary Power Unit #1 fault to high speed.
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer Flight-Critical Aft #1 Input/Output Errors.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater "A"
inoperative.
Flash Evaporator System Hi-load inboard duct temperature low.
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 seal leak into drain bottle.
Right Orbital Maneuvering System engine cover heater system "B" failed
off.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 fuel pump heater "B" cycling high.
Cryogenic Oxygen manifold #2 isolation valve did not close.
Right vent door #3 motor #1 operating on 2 phases.
External Tank/Orbiter Liquid Oxygen aft separation hole plugger failed.
Right-hand stop bolt was bent on centering ring of forward External Tank
attach separation assembly.
SRB
1
2
Right Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post #2 broached and shoe lifted
from Mobile Launch Platform during liftoff.
Right Solid Rocket Booster forward segment missing Thermal Protection
System from forward section of systems tunnel cover.
SRM
1
2
3
4
5
Left Solid Rocket Motor rock actuator bracket damage.
Left Solid Rocket Motor factory joint weather seal forward edge unbonds.
Putty on right Solid Rocket Motor igniter outer gasket and left Solid
Rocket Motor igniter gasket retainer.
Left Solid Rocket Motor center field joint aft side unbond of K5NA
closeout.
Left and right Solid Rocket Motor aft dome Ethylene Propylene Diene
Monomer blisters.
7-2 STS-34 Postflight Edition
1SECTION 7 INDEX - (Cont.)
Main injector heat shield retainer ring segment failure.
KSC
1 Connectors on Solid Rocket Boosters improperly torqued and lockwired.
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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AC
ACA
AFB
AFTA
AMOS
APS
APU
ARS
ATP
AVVI
BFS
BITE
CA
CAD
CC
CCA
CCS
CFF
CH
CPM
CRU
CV
CVAS
DCS
DCU
DMA
DWV
EAFB
ECLSS
ECP
ECS
EDT
EIU
EPDM
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Alternating Cku-rent
Annunciator Control Assembly
Air Force Base
Aft Frame Tilt Actuator
Air Force Maui Optical Site
Aft Propulsion System
Auxiliary Power Unit
Air Revitalization System
Acceptance Test Procedure
Acceptance Test Program
Altimeter Vertical Velocity Indicator
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
California
Computer Aided Drawing
Cubic Centimeter
Circuit Card Assembly
Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Carbon Fiber-Filled
Channel
Cell Performance Monitor
Converter Regulator Unit
Check Valve
Configuration Verification Accounting System
Debris Containment System
DigitalComputer Unit
Direct Memory Access
Dielectric Withstanding Voltage
Edwards Air Force Base
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Engineering Change Proposal
Environmental Control System
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
A-1 STS-34 Postflight Edition
EPS
ET
ET/SEP
ETA
F
FA
FA-1
FC
FCL
FCS
FCV
FD-2
FDA
FES
FID
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FP
fps
FRR
ft
ft/sec
g
GG
GG/FP
GGVM
GH2
GHCD
GN2
GOX
GPC
gpm
GSE
n 2
HDP
HPFTP
rIPOTP
HR
HVAC
Hz
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Electrical Power Systems
External Tank
External Tank/Separation
External Tank Attachment, Explosive Train Assembly
Fahrenheit
Flight-Critical Aft
Flight Aft 1
Fuel Cell
Freon Coolant Loop
Night Control System
Flow Control Valve
Flight Day 2
Fault Detection and Annunciator
Flash Evaporator System
Failure Identification
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Feet Per Second
Flight Readiness Review
Feet
Feet Per Second
gravitational acceleration
Gas Generator
Gas Generator/Fuel Pump
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Hydrogen
Growth Hormone Concentration Distribution
Gaseous Nitrogen
Gaseous Oxygen
General Purpose Computer
gallons per minute
Ground Support Equipment
Hydrogen
Holddown Post
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hazard Report
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
Hertz
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TIO
TEA
TFA
in-lb
in/sec
INTG
IUS
JPL
JSC
Kbit
KSC
L-2
lb
lb/hr
LCC
LDC
LH
LH2
LiOH
LO2
LOX
LPFP
LRU
LSFR
MADS
MCC
MDM
ME
MEC
MECO
MET
MLE
MLI
MLP
MPS
MPSS
MSA-1
MSE
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Input/Output
Integrated Electronics Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inch-Pounds
Inches Per Second
Integration
Inertial Upper Stage
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Kilobit
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Day Review
Pound
Pounds Per Hour
Launch Commit Criteria
Lot Date Code
Left Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Lithium Hydroxide
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Pump
Line Replaceable Unit
Launch Site Flow Review
Modular Auxiliary Data Systems
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine
Main Engine Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Mission Elapsed Time
Mesoscale Lightning Experiment
Multilayer Insulation
Mobile Launch Platform
Main Propulsion System
Main Parachute Support Structure
Marshall Sprayable Ablator No. 1
Mission Safety Evaluation
A-3 STS-34 Postflight Edition
rrl._ec
MSFC
MTBF
mV
NASA
NBR
NDI
Ni
NLG
NPSP
NSI
NSRS
NSTS
02
OFP
OI
OMI
OMRSD
OMS
OPO
OPOV
OPS-0
ORBI
OV
PAR
PASS
PDU
PLS
PM
PRCB
PRD
psi
psia
psig
PTI
Q
QD
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Millisecond
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mean-Time-Between Failure
MiUivolt
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nitrite Butadiene Rubber
Nondestructive Inspection
Nickel
Nose Landing Gear
Net Positive Static Pressure
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
National Space Transportation System
Oxygen
Orbiter Processing Facility
Operational Instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Project Office
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Operational Software Mode 0
Orbiter
Orbiter Vehicle
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Primary Avionics Software System
Power Drive Unit
Primary Landing Site
Polymer Morphology
Program Requirements Control Board
Pressure Relief Device
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Program Test Inputs
Dynamic Pressure
Quick Disconnect
A-4 STS-34 Postflight Edition
RCN
RCS
RH
RI
RM
RTG
RTLS
RTV
S/N
S&A
SEP
SLA
SMDC
SR&QA
SRB
SRBTS
SRM
SRM&QA
SSC
SSBUV
SSME
SSRP
STEX
STS
TAL
TBI
TCDT
TDRS
TPS
TVC
U/N
UCR
USBI
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Requirements Change Notice
Reaction Control System
Right-Hand
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return to Launch Site
Room Temperature Vulcanizate
Serial Number
Safe and Arm
Separation
Super Light Ablative
Shielded Mild Detonating Cord
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Beacon Tracking System
Solid Rocket Motor
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Stems Space Center
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Sensor Technology Experiment
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Through-Bulkhead Initiator
Trail Countdown Test
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Thermal Protection System
Thrust Vector Control
Unit Number
Unsatisfactory Condition Report
United Space Booster, Inc.
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VPF
VREL
VSWR
WONG
WOW
WSB
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont.)
Vertical Processing Facility
Relative Velocity
Voltage Standing Wave Ratio
Weight-On-Nose Gear
Weight On Wheels
Water Spray Boiler
A-6 STS-34 Postflight Edition
